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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et
al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2010. Sequential spatial competition in
vertically related industries with di¤erent product varieties. Economics Letters 106,
112-114]. Specically, we prove that following a vertical merger, the downstream rms
will locate away from the social optimum in the following manner: to the direction of
the un-integrated follower or to a direction determined by the wholesale price charged
to the un-integrated leader.
JEL classication: L13, L42, D43, R32
Keywords: Product di¤erentiation; Spatial price discrimination; Sequential competition;
Merger
1 Introduction
In their paper Beladi et al. (2010) attempt to extend the work of Braid (2008) by examining
the e¤ect of a vertical merger on the equilibrium locations of two downstream rms, which are
engaged in sequential spatial competition and sell di¤erent varieties of a product. Their main
ndings can be summarized as follows: (a) In the pre-merger case, both downstream rms
will locate away from the socially optimal location towards opposite directions (i.e., they
will diverge from the middle of the linear market) and (b) A merger between the upstream
monopolist and either of the downstream competitors, will induce both downstream rms
to locate further away (compared to the pre-merger case) from the socially optimal location
towards opposite directions.
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The precision of the above results has been compromised by both technical and conceptual
aws. Specically, Beladi et al. (2010) fail to appropriately account for the wholesale price
e¤ects.
We show that:
(i) in the absence of any vertical merger, downstream rms will locate away from the
social optimum
(ii) a merger between the upstream monopolist and the downstream leader will locate
the rms away from the socially optimal location, to the direction of the un-integrated rm
while
(iii) a merger between the upstream monopolist and the downstream follower will locate
the rms away from the socially optimal location, to a direction depending on the wholesale
price the upstream monopolist is charging the un-integrated leader.
2 Model and Results
The notation follows that in Beladi et al. (2010). Two downstream rms, Ri, i = 1; 2,
compete in a vertically related industry where the only input (intermediate good) required
for downstream production is provided by an upstream supplier, M . The intermediate good
is transformed (on a one-to-one basis) by R1 and R2 into the di¤erentiated nal goods
they sell to uniformly distributed consumers with unit density on a uni-dimensional (linear)
market interval with support [0; 1]. The location of R1 and R2 is denoted by x and y,
respectively, with x < y in [0; 1]. Consumers are o¤ered three varieties of a di¤erentiated
product: U and W from rm R1 and V and W from rm R2. We assume that the fraction
of consumers buying only good U is equal to the fraction of consumers buying good V ,
and both equal to c. A fraction b of consumers buys W .1 Our assumptions about the
provision of downstream goods imply that R1 and R2 enjoy monopoly power over the goods
(or varieties) U and V while they compete for market share regarding the good (or variety)
W . Transportation costs are equal to td, where t is a positive scalar and d is the distance
1If a denotes the fraction of consumers deciding to buy no good, then it is clear that b + 2c + a = 1.
Fractions b, c and a are constant throughout.
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shipped. The maximum reservation price a consumer is willing to pay for any product is
denoted by k. This price is su¢ ciently large and becomes relevant only for product varieties
where there is no competition between the two rms. Downstream rms bear transportation
costs, with their marginal delivered cost for selling at location z being equal to the marginal
production costs plus the transportation cost for shipping the good to the consumers location
z. The pricing of downstream goods is as follows. For goods U and V , the downstream rms
take advantage of their monopoly power and charge all consumers innitesimally less than
k. For good W , there is Bertrand competition à la Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer
(1937). Specically, the price charged for W by the rm that is closer to the consumer is
equal to (or innitesimally less than) the delivered cost of the rm that is further away.
The structure of the game follows Beladi et al. (2008) with the exception that R1 and
R2 choose their locations sequentially (with R1 being the leader and R2 the follower) and
not simultaneously. In particular, rms and consumers are engaged in a six stage game of
complete information. In the rst stage, M makes a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tari¤ o¤er,
(wi; Fi), i = 1; 2, to rm Ri, where wi denotes the marginal wholesale price and Fi is a xed
fee. In the second stage, R1 and R2 simultaneously decide whether or not to accept or decline
the two-part tari¤ contract o¤ered by the upstream monopolist, M . In the third stage, R1
chooses its location in the market. Having observed the location decision of R1, R2 chooses
its location in the fourth stage. In stage ve of the game downstream rms engage in spatial
price discrimination by choosing delivered price schedules. In the nal stage, consumers
make their purchasing choices to clear the market.
The solution of the game is given by backward induction and a comparison is being made
between three distinct cases: the case where none of the two rms merges upstream and the
case where either the downstream leader (R1) or the downstream follower (R2) merges with
M . Let r = b
4(b+c)
and  = 5b2 + 16c2 + 20bc.
Absent a vertical merger, the prot function of R2 is given by
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2(x; y) =

c(k   w2)  ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2
+
0@ R y(x+y2 +w2 w12t ) b[t(2z   x  y) + w1   w2]dz
+
R 1
y
b[t(y   x) + w1   w2]dz
1A  F2 (1)
where x+y
2
+ w2 w1
2t
indicates the location of the indi¤erent consumer and w2 w1
2t
 y x
2
:2
More specically, the location s of the indi¤erent consumer for good W is determined by
equating the two delivered costs in regard to the common goodW : t (y   s)+w2 = t (s  x)+
w1 =) s = x+y2 + w2 w12t . Solving the rst order condition for prot maximization we obtain
R2s reaction function:
y(x) =
4t(b+ c) + 2tbx+ 2b(w2   w1)
2t(4c+ 3b)
(2)
Notice that y(x) is expectedly a function of both w1 and w2 as opposed to the corresponding
result in Beladi et al. (2010), equation (2) where y(x) depends only on w2.
The prot function of R1 is
1(x; y(x)) =

c(k   w1)  ct
2

x2 + (1  x)2
+
0@ R x0 b[t(y(x)  x) + w2   w1]dz
+
R (x+y(x)2 +w2 w12t )
x
b[t(x+ y(x)  2z) + w2   w1]dz
1A  F1 (3)
The above equations serve to correct equations (1), (2) and (3) respectively in Beladi et
al. (2010). Beladi et al. (2010) (incorrectly) do not account for the fact that the delivered
cost for good W of the rm that is located further away, which is equal to the sum of its
transportation cost and marginal cost, is equal to the price charged to consumers by its rival
[see Braid, 2008, p. 345]: Since the marginal cost of Ri is equal to the wholesale price wi,
2If w2 w12t >
y x
2 , both rms are reduced to spatial-price discriminating monopolists where the common
good W is now provided only by rm R. We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case where
w2 w1
2t  y x2 : Moreover, w2 w12t  y x2 guarantees the existence of non-negative prots for the downstream
rms.
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the prots of R1 realizing a sale of good W to a customer located at place z, will be equal
to w2+ t (y   z)  t jz   xj  w1 = t (y   z)  t jz   xj+w2 w1. The corresponding prots
for R2 can be dened in a similar way. Further, the misconception regarding the delivered
costs by Beladi et al. (2010) leads to the incorrect denition of the threshold determining
the segment of the market captured by each rm concerning the common good W . This
threshold, s, denes the limit of integration and its correct derivation is mentioned above.
Solving the rst order condition for prot maximization of R1 and substituting the solu-
tion into (2), we get
x =

1
2
  r

+
b[bt(3b+ 4c) + (4b+ 4c)2(w2   w1)]
4t(b+ c)
(4)
y =

1
2
+ r

+
b[tb2 + 4(3b+ 4c)(b+ c)(w2   w1)]
4t(b+ c)
(5)
This leads to the following proposition.3
Proposition 1 Absent the possibility of any merger, the Nash equilibrium locations of the
two downstream rms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry, areh 
1
2
  r+ b[bt(3b+4c)+(4b+4c)2(w2 w1)]
4t(b+c)
i
for the leader and
h 
1
2
+ r

+ b[tb
2+4(3b+4c)(b+c)(w2 w1)]
4t(b+c)
i
for the follower. These locations are di¤erent from the social optimum, (x; y) =
 
1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

.4
The results in Proposition 1 are di¤erent than (and serve to correct) the results in Beladi
et al. (2010).
In case of a merger taking place between the upstream rm M and R1, then (w1; F1) =
(0; 0) and the prots of the downstream rms R1 and R2, respectively become
1(x; y) =

ck   ct
2

x2 + (1  x)2
+
0@ R x0 b[t(y   x) + w2]dz
+
R (x+y2 +w22t )
x
b[t(x+ y   2z) + w2]dz
1A (6)
3Throughout the paper, for brevity, we omit the details of the calculations which are available upon
request.
4The total welfare is dened as the sum of the total prots (upstream and downstream) and total
consumer surplus. The socially optimal location can be easily derived by maximizing total welfare with
respect to x and y and solving the system of equations.
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2(x; y) =

c(k   w2)  ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2
+
0@ R y(x+y2 +w22t ) b[t(2z   x  y)  w2]dz
+
R 1
y
b[t(y   x)  w2]dz
1A  F2 (7)
Solving the rst order condition for R2s prot maximization we obtain R2s reaction
function:
y(x) =
2t(b+ c) + b(w2 + tx)
t(3b+ 4c)
(8)
Either substituting (8) into (6) and solving the rst order condition for R1s prot-
maximization or setting w1 = 0 into (4) and (5) we get the following Nash equilibrium
locations respectively
x =

1
2
  r

+
b[bt(3b+ 4c) + (4b+ 4c)2w2]
4t(b+ c)
(9)
y =

1
2
+ r

+
b[tb2 + 4(3b+ 4c)(b+ c)w2]
4t(b+ c)
(10)
This leads to the following propositions.
Proposition 2 If the downstream leader merges upstream, the Nash equilibrium locations of
the two downstream rms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry, areh 
1
2
  r+ b[bt(3b+4c)+(4b+4c)2w2]
4t(b+c)
i
for the integrated rm and
h 
1
2
+ r

+ b[tb
2+4(3b+4c)(b+c)w2]
4t(b+c)
i
for the un-integrated rm.
Proposition 3 A merger between the downstream leader and the upstream monopolist in-
duces both downstream rms to move away from the social optimal location (x; y) = 
1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

, to the direction of the un-integrated rm decreasing their in-between distance
provided b 6= 0.
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 are di¤erent than (and serve to correct) the results
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in Beladi et al. (2010) for the case of a merger between the upstream monopolist and the
downstream leader.
In case of a merger between M and R2, M sets (w2; F2) = (0; 0) and the prot functions
of R1 and R2 are respectively given by
1(x; y) =

c(k   w1)  ct
2

x2 + (1  x)2
+
0@ R x0 b[t(y   x)  w1]dz
+
R (x+y2  w12t )
x
b[t(x+ y   2z)  w1]dz
1A  F1 (11)
2(x; y) =

ck   ct
2

y2 + (1  y)2
+
0@ R y(x+y2  w12t ) b[t(2z   x  y) + w1]dz
+
R 1
y
b[t(y   x) + w1]dz
1A (12)
Either solving the rst order condition for prot maximization or letting w2 = 0 in (2)
we obtain R2s reaction function:
y(x) =
4t(b+ c) + 2tbx  2bw1
2t(4c+ 3b)
(13)
Substituting (13) into (11) and solving the rst order condition forR1s prot-maximization,
or equivalently, letting w2 = 0 in (4) and (5), we get the following Nash equilibrium locations
x =

1
2
  r

+
b[bt(3b+ 4c)  (4b+ 4c)2w1]
4t(b+ c)
(14)
y =

1
2
+ r

+
b[tb2   4(3b+ 4c)(b+ c)w1]
4t(b+ c)
(15)
This leads to the following two propositions.
Proposition 4 If the downstream follower merges upstream, the Nash equilibrium locations
of the two downstream rms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry,
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are
h 
1
2
  r+ b[bt(3b+4c) (4b+4c)2w1]
4t(b+c)
i
for the un-integrated rm and
h 
1
2
+ r

+ b[tb
2 4(3b+4c)(b+c)w1]
4t(b+c)
i
for the integrated rm.
Proposition 5 A merger between the downstream follower and the upstream monopolist
induces both downstream rms to move away from the social optimal location (x; y) = 
1
2
  r; 1
2
+ r

, towards a direction depending on the wholesale price the follower through the
upstream monopolist is charging the un-integrated leader.
The results in Propositions 4 and 5 are di¤erent than (and serve to correct) the results
in Beladi et al. (2010) for the case of a merger between the upstream monopolist and the
downstream follower.
The intuition behind the result in Propositions 3 is the same as in Eleftheriou and
Michelacakis (2016). More specically, the un-integrated rm having lost its competitive
edge is forced to give away part of its market share. Moreover, Proposition 5 implies that
by controlling the wholesale price as a result of the vertical merger, the downstream follower
takes the advantage over the downstream leader. It is precisely for this reason that a market
leader is unlikely to accept a situation where his upstream provider has identical interests
with his competition follower.
3 Conclusion
We have shown that in contrast to Beladi et al. (2010): (i) in the pre-merger case, down-
stream rms locate away from the social optimum and (ii) in the case of a vertical merger,
downstream rms locate away from the social optimum to either the direction of the un-
integrated follower or to the direction determined by the wholesale price charged to the
un-integrated leader. The authors intend to further extend the results of the current study
in a forthcoming paper.
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